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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
without the questionable finding on the naturalness of the object. 19 The
court in its estimation of common knowledge might have held as a mat-
ter of law that one who eats corn flakes should anticipate the presence
of an occasional hard object derived from corn.20 However, it is equally
conceivable that the court would have left the question of reasonable fit-
ness to the jury.2 1
The present trend is toward using naturalness as only one factor
among others in order to determine what the consumer should expect.
Other jurisdictions have rejected the limitations of the Mix rule with
or without factual distinctions from the Mix case. Adams is factually
more distinguishable from Mix than the other holdings which follow its
rationale. It is submitted that reliance upon the consumer-expectation
rationale would provide a sounder basis for determining liability in fu-
ture cases arising in this area.
JorHN H. P. HELMS
Res Judicata-Consent Judgment in Favor of Infant as Bar to
Litigation Between Joint Tortfeasors.
In Pack v. McCoy' the plaintiff brought suit to recover for his per-
sonal injuries and property damage arising out of a motorcycle-bus col-
lision. Plaintiff was the operator of the motorcycle and defendants were
the bus driver and the bus company. In a previous personal injury
action a bus passenger, an infant, had sued the bus company, the bus
driver, and the motorcycle operator as joint tort-feasors. The infant's
suit was settled by a consent judgment entered in her favor against all
defendants. The defendants in Pack pleaded res judicata, asserting
that the prior judgment was a final adjudication of the issue of negli-
gence between the present parties. The supreme court reversed the trial
court's order striking the defense.2
" Naturalness would be relevant in some cases, but in others this test properly
could be omitted and the decision placed on what the consumer should expect, with
other criteria determining the issue.
2' See Allen v. Grafton, 170 Ohio St. 249, 164 N.E.2d 167 (1960), where the
court took the case from the jury on the ground that common knowledge requires
that consumers of fried oysters anticipate the presence therein of an occasional
piece of oyster shell.
2' In most of the recent cases which have used "naturalness" only in conjunc-
tion with other criteria, the question of reasonable fitness has been left to the jury.
E.g., Bryer v. Rath Packing Co., 221 Md. 105, 156 A.2d 442 (1959); Lore v.
De Simone Bros., 172 N.Y.S2d 829 (Sup. Ct. 1958); Wood v. Waldorf Sys.,
Inc., 79 R.I. 1, 83 A2d 90 (1951); Betehia v. Cape Cod Corp., 10 Wis. 2d 323,
.103 N.W.2d 64 (1960). Contra, Allen v. Grafton, 170 Ohio St. 249, 164 N.E2d
167 (1960).
1251 N.C. 590, 112 S.E2d 118 (1959).
-There was a dissent. Judge Bobbitt (Judge Parker joining) thought there
had not been an adjudication of the negligence between the former defendants, that
the defense should not be allowed, and that precedents to the contrary should be
over-ruled. 251 N.C. at 593, 112 S.E.2d at 121.
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Two defendants may settle a plaintiff's claim out of court, and this
settlement will not be res judicata as to their rights and liabilities inter
sa if they subsequently litigate their own claims.3 Also, a plaintiff's
voluntary non-suit taken after an extra-judicial settlement of his claim
will not bar future litigation between the original defendants. 4 But if
the plaintiff in the original action happens to be an infant, the present
decision indicates that the necessary court approval of the settlement,5
as evidenced by the consent judgment, will bar any further action be-
tween the former defendants.
In the principal case the court expressly relied on Lumberton Coach
Co. v. Stone, which held that a previous consent judgment in favor of
an adult plaintiff barred a suit between the former defendants. In fol-
lowing this precedent the court adhered to the rule that '-'a judgment
for the plaintiff against two or more defendants charged with joint and
concurrent negligence establishes their negligence and may be pleaded
in bar by one defendant against the other in a subsequent action between
them based on the negligent acts at issue in the first cause." It is true
that in a subsequent suit between the defendants to collect contribution
the issue of the defendants' negligence to the plaintiff is res judicata.8
This situation, however, is clearly distinguishable from that presented
in either Lumberton Coach Co. or the principal case. In the latter two
instances the second action is based upon the damage allegedly caused
one defendant by the negligence of the other, and the recovery sought is
not a pro rata share of the damages owed the original plaintiff but the
damages sustained by the former defendant himself.
Since North Carolina holds that a consent judgment in favor of the
plaintiff constitutes res judicata in any later action between the defend-
ants, it would seem to follow that a judgment on the merits in the first
suit would bar the subsequent action. Where the first action has re-
sulted in a verdict on the merits, the great majority of courts hold that
a second action (between the original defendants) is not barred by the
first judgment.9 This is true in all jurisdictions except New York,
'Penn Dixie Lines, Inc. v. Grannick, 238 N.C. 552, 78 S.E.2d 410 (1953).
'Mercer v. Hilliard, 249 N.C. 725, 107 S.E,2d 554 (1959).
An infant's contract may be avoided. Chandler v. Jones, 172 N.C. 569, 90
S.E. 580 (1916). Thus it is necessary that a court pass on any settlement where a
party is a minor. Where the judgment recites an investigation by the court and
a finding that the compromise is just, the judgment is binding in the absence of
fraud. Oates v. The Texas Co., 203 N.C. 474, 166 S.E. 317 (1932).
"235 N.C. 619, 70 S.E.2d 673 (1952).7 251 N.C. at 593, 112 S.E.2d at 120.
'Under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-240 (1953), each defendant found to be a joint
tortfeasor is liable to the plaintiff for a proportionate amount of the judgment ren-
dered; if any defendant pays more than his proportionate part, he can obtain con-
tribution from the other joint tortfeasors.
'E.g., Hellenic Lines v. The Exmouth, 253 F.2d 473 (2d Cir. 1957) ; Kimmel v.
Yankee Lines, 224 F.2d 644 (3d Cir. 1955) ; St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
Dowdell, 109 So. 2d 151 (Ala. 1959) ; Casey v. Balunas, 19 Conn. Supp. 365, 113
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where the decisions are in conflict.10 The majority of courts" reason
that in the first suit the co-defendants were not adverse parties and their
rights and liabilities as between themselves were not put in issue nor
litigated.1 2  Where the co-defendants were actually adverse parties in
the first suit and the issue of their negligence to each other was litigated,
the judgment rendered therein will act as a bar to further litigation
between them.13 In North Carolina where the defendants are joined in
the first suit they could never be true adverse parties since our court
has held that one defendant may not cross claim another in an action
where the plaintiff has sued both as joint tortfeasors.' 4  Since the issue
of negligence as between the defendants cannot properly be adjudicated
in the first suit, the judgment should not be res judicata as to such
negligence.
In the principal case the consent judgment appears to be the result
of a friendly suit to facilitate the settlement of the infant's claims."
The North Carolina court has said, "The law favors the settlement of
controversies out of court."' 6  It is submitted that settlements in court
should also be encouraged. The court should recognize, as it has in the
A.2d 867 (1955); Clark's Adm'x v. Rucker, 258 S.W.2d 9 (Ky. 1953); Bunge v.
Yager, 236 Minn. 245, 52 N.W.2d 446 (1952); Boston & M.R.R. v. Sargent, 72
N.H. 455, 57 Atl. 688 (1904); Wiles v. Young, 167 Tenn. 224, 68 S.W.2d 114
(1934) ; Ray v. Consolidated Freightways, 4 Utah 2d 137, 289 P.2d 196 (1955) ;
Byrum v. Ames & Webb, Inc., 196 Va. 597, 85 S.E.2d 364 (1955). A fortiori a
consent judgment would not bar the second action.
10 Holding that the prior suit is not res judicata are Israel v. Krupa, 180 Misc.
995, 43 N.Y.S.2d 113 (Sup. Ct. 1943) ; Glasser v. Huette, 232 App. Div. 119, 249
N.Y.S. 374 aff'd mtem. 256 N.Y. 686, 177 N.E. 193 (1931). For cases contra, see
Moyle v. Cronin, 189 N.Y.S.2d 96 (Broome County Ct. 1959); James v. Saul, 184
N.Y.S.2d 934 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1958).
"The North Carolina court is in the minority and admits, "It must be con-
ceded, however, there is authority in conflict with . . .Lwnberton Coach Co. v.
Stone... However, adhering to our rule, we conclude the trial court committed
error in striking the further defense." 251 N.C. at 593, 112 S.E.2d at 121.
1" "The rendition of a judgment in an action does not conclude parties to the
action who are not adversaries under the pleadings as to their rights inter se upon
matters which they did not litigate, or have an opportunity to litigate, between
themselves." RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 82 (1942) (often quoted in majority
opinions).
" Vaughn's Adm'r v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 297 Ky. 309, 179 S.W.2d 441
(1944); accord, Simodejka v. Williams, 360 Pa. 332, 62 A.2d 17 (1948). See
generally the dissenting opinion by Clark, J., in Hellenic Lines v. The Exmouth,
253 F.2d 473 (2d Cir. 1957) (the majority held the defendants not to be adverse
parties in the first suit).
1" Bell v. Lacey, 248 N.C. 703, 104 S.E2d 833 (1958) ; Clark v. Pilot Freight
Carriers, Inc., 247 N.C. 705, 102 S.E.2d 252 (1958). But where one defendant
has another brought in for purposes of contribution, the second defendant may cross
claim against the original defendant for his own injuries or property damage.
Norris v. Johnson, 246 N.C. 179, 97 S.E.2d 773 (1957).
Brief for Appellee, pp. 2-3, Pack v. McCoy, 251 N.C. 590, 112 S.E.2d 118
(1959).
" Penn Dixie Lines, Inc. v. Grannick, 238 N.C. 552, 555, 78 S.E.2d 410, 413(1953).
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past,17 that a consent judgment merely evidences the agreement of the
parties and is not an adjudication of negligence.
In view of Pack it seems almost impossible in North Carolina for two
parties to settle a third-party-infant's claim and at the same time protect
their right to litigate the issue of damages between themselves. Either
the out-of-court settlement with the infant will be open to later disaf-
firmance, or the in-court settlement will bar future litigation between
the defendants.' 8 There is a possibility of a separate consent judgment
in favor of the infant against each of the defendants, as an injured party
may sue one or all joint tortfeasors.' 9 It is submitted that it should not
be necessary to use this cumbersome and uncertain procedure. The
writer believes that the North Carolina court should follow the reasoning
of the dissent in Pack, which would allow all parties to a controversy to
litigate their claims while at the same time encouraging the settlement of
suits by an infant.
CEARLES E. DAMERON III
Rule Against Perpetuities-Commercial Leases.
A leasehold to commence after the completion of a building was de-
clared void ab initio by the California District Court of Appeals in the
recent case of Haggerty v. City of Oakland' as a violation of the rule
against perpetuities.2 The City of Oaldand and one Goodman entered
into a written contract whereby the city was to build a building and
lease it to Goodman for a term of years. The term was not to com-
mence until the first day of the second month after completion of the
building. The lease contained no specified date for beginning construc-
tion on the building but did provide that the city "shall and will in good
faith immediately after the execution of this lease proceed with plans for
"The North Carolina Supreme Court, in holding an Ohio divorce decree not
to be a consent judgment, stated, "A judgment by consent is the agreement of the
parties.... It is not a judicial determination of the rights of the parties and does
not purport to represent the judgment of the court, but merely records the pre-
existing agreement of the parties." McRary v. McRary, 228 N.C. 714, 719, 47
S.E.2d 27, 31 (1948).
" The holding in the principal case does not apply to actions involving a con-
tract. Stanley v. Parker, 207 N.C. 159, 176 S.E. 279 (1934).
" Denny v. Coleman, 245 N.C. 90, 95 S.E.2d 352 (1956) ; Charnock v. Taylor,
223 N.C. 360, 26 S.E.2d 911 (1943). Since there can be only one recovery for
an injury, satisfaction of the infant's first consent judgment would bar a suit
against the second tortfeasor. Bell v. Hawkins, 249 N.C. 199, 105 S.E.2d 642(1958). Likewise, a release of one tortfeasor will bar an action against the other.
King v. Powell, 220 N.C. 511, 17 S.E.2d 659 (1942); Smith v. Thompson, 210
N.C. 672, 188 S.E. 395 (1936).
1 161 Cal. App. 2d 407, 326 P.2d 957 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
' Dallapi v. Campbell, 45 Cal. App. 2d 541, 114 P.2d 646 (Dist. Ct. App. 1941);
Spicer v. Moss, 409 II. 343, 100 N.E.2d 761 (1951) ; Johnson v. Preston, 226 I11.
447, 80 N.E. 1001 (1907); McQueen v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 234 N.C.
737, 68 S.E.2d 831 (1952).
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